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Shepherd v. Fregozo6/13/2005
e insured's Chevrolet. It is regular use of other automobiles that brings the exclusionary clause into operation, and if insured's employer assigns him one specific automobile for regular use or a number of automobiles, any one of which may be assigned for a particular trip, the result is the same. An automobile is furnished insured "for regular use" in either event. We know of no authority holding to the contrary.
Moore v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 121 So.2d 125, 126-27 (Miss.1960).
While Tennessee courts have not dealt specifically with a case involving the "regular use" exclusion as it relates to uninsured motorist coverage, this Court has made it clear as to liability coverage that the "regular use" exclusion is applicable and enforceable. In United Servs. Auto Ass'n. v. Couch, 643 S.W.2d 668 (Tenn.Ct.App.1982) United Services Automobile Association had issued a policy of liability insurance to one Rebecca W. Couch insuring her automobile. Her son, residing in her household, was operating a non-owned vehicle and was involved in a collision. The non-owned vehicle, supplied by the employer of the son, was asserted by the insurance carrier to be a "regular use" vehicle within the meaning of the exclusion. The trial court declared coverage, and on appeal, this Court reversed finding that it was clear that the automobile driven by the son was used by him in his work on a regular basis. This Court said:
The issue of regularity hinges not so much upon the regularity of the working time of the operator, but upon the regularity with which the vehicle was furnished or available. In the present case, it is uncontroverted that the vehicle was regularly, i.e., constantly, available to the employees of Mr. Canterbury, including William Couch, III, when he was on duty. In this sense, the vehicle was regularly available to Couch within the meaning of the policy exclusion.
The obvious purpose of the "non-owned vehicle" coverage is to afford protection to the insured on occasions when the insured is temporarily using a vehicle not covered by the policy.
The obvious purpose of the exclusion under discussion is to prevent abuse of the "non-owned" privilege by unnecessarily burdening the insurer with liability which ought to be covered by other insurance.
United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Couch, 643 S.W.2d 668, 672 (Tenn.Ct.App.1982).
In sister jurisdictions, a body of law has developed under the "regular use" exclusion as it relates to police vehicles available for regular use to policemen. As in other cases, this body of law started with the exclusion of liability coverage and then expanded into the uninsured motorist coverage. In O'Brien v. Halifax Ins. Co. of Massachusetts, 141 So.2d 307, Plaintiff was a police officer employed by Ormond Beach, Florida, and was insured as to his personal automobile by the Defendant insurance company. In his work as a police officer, Plaintiff was expected to and did use whichever one of four city-owned cars was assigned to him. While driving one of such vehicles, he was involved in an accident and sustained various personal injuries. He sued his private insurance company for medical benefits under his policy of insurance. The trial court, applying the "regular use" exclusion, directed a verdict for the defendant, and the District Court of Appeals of Florida, relying on Moore v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 121 So.2d 125 (Miss.1950) affirmed the judgment. Said the Court:
The holding in the Moore case that an exclusionary clause involved in that case, identical to that in the instant case, is not ambiguous when read in conjunction with the general coverage clause, appears to represent th
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