 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Watkins v. Tankersley Construction6/29/2005
ing, supervision, observation of construction, or construction of an improvement to real property, for injury to property, real or personal, arising out of any such deficiency, or for injury to the person or for wrongful death arising out of any such deficiency, shall be brought against any person performing or furnishing the design, planning, supervision, observation of construction, construction of, or land surveying in connection with, such an improvement within four (4) years after substantial completion of such an improvement.
Tenn. Code Ann. ยง 28-3-202 (2000). The language in the statute says that it applies to all actions involving defects "in the design, planning, supervision, observation of construction, or construction of an improvement to real property." In addition, the four-year time limitation begins to accrue "after substantial completion of such an improvement." Id.
On December 22, 2003, the trial court held a hearing on defendant Munford's motion for summary judgment. On December 30, 2003, the trial court entered an order granting summary judgment to Munford based on the four-year time limitation set out in Section 28-3-202. On March 1, 2004, the trial court held a hearing on the motions for summary judgment filed by the Watkins, Tankersley/Tankersley Construction, and Charles Walker/Walker Enterprises (collectively, "Walker defendants"). At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of Tankersley/Tankersley Construction and the Walker defendants, also based on the four-year statute of repose. The trial court found that the statute of repose was applicable to an action such as this, in which damages are sought for deficiencies in an improvement to real property caused by soil instability. The trial court reasoned that, because the house was substantially completed in March 1994, and the complaint was filed over six years later in April 2000, the lawsuit was untimely under the statute's four-year time limitation. The Watkins now appeal, challenging only the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Walker defendants.
On appeal, the Watkins argue that the trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law that the grading and filling of their property constituted the "construction of an improvement to real property," thus subjecting their cause of action to the four-year time limitation in Section 28-3-202. They concede that, if the grading work performed by the Walker defendants constitutes the construction of an improvement to real property, then their suit is time barred. Therefore, the sole issue in this appeal is whether the trial court erred in finding that the Walker defendants' actions constituted the construction of an improvement to real property, and the resulting conclusion that Section 28-3-202 governs the Watkins' claims.
We review the trial court's grant of summary judgment de novo with no presumption of correctness. Warren v. Estate of Kirk, 954 S.W.2d 722, 723 (Tenn. 1997). Summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. This case presents an issue of statutory interpretation, which is also reviewed de novo. Honsa v. Tombigbee Transp. Corp., 141 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tenn. 2004). In construing a statute, we must "ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent without unduly restricting or expanding a statute's coverage beyond its intended scope." Id. (quoting Houghton v. Aramark Educ. Res., Inc., 90 S.W.3d 676, 678 (Tenn. 2002)
Page 1 2 3 4 5 Tennessee Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
By using the system, you agree to TERMS OF SERVICE
|