 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Watkins v. Tankersley Construction6/29/2005
(quoting Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn.1995))). Legislative intent can be determined "from the natural and ordinary meaning of the statutory language within the context of the entire statute without any forced or subtle construction that would extend or limit the statute's meaning." Id. (quoting State v. Flemming, 19 S.W.3d 195, 197 (Tenn.2000)). Where the language is clear and unambiguous, we must apply the statute as written. Id.; see also Limbaugh v. Coffee Med. Ctr., 59 S.W.3d 73, 83 (Tenn. 2001).
The trial court cited several cases in support of its decision that the grading, filling, and preparation of a site for construction is the "construction of an improvement to real property" within the meaning of Section 28-3-202. The trial court noted Lonning v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 725 S.W.2d 682 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986), in which the plaintiffs sued the builder for fraudulently concealing the fact that the soil in the lot on which their house was to be built would not "percolate." The Lonning court held that the plaintiffs' lawsuit resulted from the construction of an improvement to real property and, therefore, the time limitation in Section 28-3-202 was applicable. Lonning, 725 S.W.2d at 685. The trial court below also relied on Williams v. Thompson, 443 S.W.2d 447 (Tenn. 1969), in which the Tennessee Supreme Court held that an action for damages to residential property, including damages for the settling of the foundation and sinking of the house into the ground, was governed by the three-year statute of limitations applicable to actions for injuries to real property, rather than by the six-year statute of limitations governing contracts. The Williams court held that determining the applicable statute of limitations depended on the "subject matter of the controversy" and not on the remedial procedure. Williams, 443 S.W.2d at 449.
The trial court also cited Memphis Light Gas & Water v. T.L. James & Co., No. 52, 1986 WL 11588 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 1986) ("MLG&W"). In that case, the Tennessee Department of Transportation hired a contractor to construct a segment of an interstate highway. A provision in the contract required the contractor to obtain material for the construction of the roadbed from specified "borrow pits." Borrow pit No. 6 was designated as the source for a particular segment of the road bed. The contractor hired a subcontractor to dredge the borrow pits. After this dredging was completed, the subcontractor was no longer involved with the project. The project was completed in April 1978. At that time, borrow pit No. 6 was serving as a reservoir to retain surface water drained to surrounding areas. MLG&W, 1986 WL 11588, at *1. In December 1982, the Memphis utility company, Memphis Light, Gas & Water ("MLG&W"), discovered that a water main had collapsed and separated in the vicinity of borrow pit No. 6. In July 1984, MLG&W filed suit against the contractor and the subcontractor, alleging that negligence in the dredging resulted in damages to the water main. Id. at *1.
In MLG&W, both the contractor and the subcontractor filed motions for summary judgment based on the four-year statute of repose in Section 28-3-202. MLG&W challenged the motions, arguing that dredging in borrow pit No. 6 was not "an improvement to real property" within the meaning of the statute. The trial court held that, because the excavation of the borrow pit was a part of improvement to real property, it "was therefore itself an improvement to real property within the meaning of Sec. 28-3-202 . . . ." Id. at *2. The appellate court agreed and determined that the term "improvement" should be given its usual and ordinary meaning. The court defined the term
Page 1 2 3 4 5 Tennessee Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|