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Hudson v. Cooper3/22/2005
In this suit for attorney compensation , Barbara Jackson Hudson appeals a take-nothing judgment in favor of Jayla Cooper on the grounds that: (1) the trial court erred in granting a directed verdict against Hudson's quantum meruit claim; and (2) the jury finding against Hudson's breach of contract claim was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.
Background
Cooper entered into a written contingency fee agreement (the "agreement") for Hudson to represent her in asserting a personal injury claim. Before the case was concluded, Cooper discharged Hudson and hired other counsel. Hudson filed a plea in intervention in the personal injury case, seeking compensation for the legal services she had provided, and Cooper entered into a settlement of her personal injury claims. At the trial on Hudson's claims, the trial court granted a directed verdict against the quantum meruit claim, and the jury found against Hudson on the breach of contract claim.
Contract Claim
The first question in the jury charge (the "charge") asked whether a contract existed between Cooper and Hudson, and the jury answered affirmatively. The second question (and accompanying instruction) then asked:
Did [Cooper] fail to comply with the agreement?
Failure to comply by [Cooper] is excused by [Hudson's] prior repudiation, if any, of the same agreement.
A party repudiates an agreement when she indicates by her words or actions that she is not going to perform her obligations under the agreement in the future, showing a fixed intention to abandon, renounce and refuse to perform the terms of the contract.
The jury answered "no" to this question, and Hudson's second issue contends that this finding was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.
We review such a factual sufficiency challenge by weighing and considering all the evidence in the case. Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex. 2003). However, we may not pass upon the witnesses' credibility or substitute our judgment for that of the jury, even if the evidence would clearly support a different result. Id. Instead, the judgment will be set aside only if the evidence is so factually weak, or the verdict so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence, as to make the judgment clearly wrong and unjust. Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 242 (Tex. 2001).
In this case, Cooper testified that, two weeks before trial was scheduled on her personal injury claims, Hudson told her that: (1) she (Hudson) was ill; (2) she would be unable to go to trial; (3) she was not prepared to go to trial; and (4) Cooper would have to find another attorney. This evidence was legally sufficient to support a finding that Hudson repudiated her agreement to represent Cooper in the lawsuit and, thus, a negative answer to question 2 of the charge. Although Hudson presented conflicting testimony of the circumstances leading to her discharge by Cooper, it does not render the evidence supporting the verdict so factually weak, or the verdict so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence, as to make the judgment clearly wrong and unjust. Therefore, Hudson's second issue is overruled.
Quantum Meruit Claim
Cooper's motion for directed verdict asserted that there "has been no testimony as it relates to any kind of quantum meruit finding . . .", and the trial court's judgment states that this motion was granted because Hudson "failed to introduce any probative evidence of quantum meruit claim . . . ." Hudson's first issue challenges the d
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