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Robnett v. Kirklin Law Firm6/2/2005
ry 2003, the trial court ordered that funds be deposited into the registry of the court and that funds due to the Thomas plaintiffs under the settlement be released. Certain funds remained in the court registry pending resolution of the fee dispute between Robnett and the firm.
The trial court rendered summary judgment on February 27, 2003. On the same day, without having sought leave to file a late response, Robnett filed her supplemental response to the firm's motion for summary judgment.
Standard of Review
In moving for summary judgment under rule 166a(a) on its intervention claim, the firm had the burden to prove that it was entitled to judgment by establishing each element of its claim or defense as a matter of law, or by negating an element of the claim or defense of the opposing party, in this case, Robnett, as a matter of law. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(a)--(b) (comment). Summary judgment is proper only when the movant establishes that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rhône-Poulenc, Inc. v. Steel, 997 S.W.2d 217, 222 (Tex. 1999); Jones v. Legal Copy, Inc., 846 S.W.2d 922, 924 (Tex. App.---Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ). In reviewing a summary judgment, we assume that all evidence favorable to the non-movant is true, Walker v. Harris, 924 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Tex. 1996), and indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any reasonable doubt in the non-movant's favor. Science Spectrum, Inc. v. Martinez, 941 S.W.2d 910, 911 (Tex. 1997); Jones, 846 S.W.2d at 924.
Once the movant establishes that it is entitled to summary judgment, the non-movant can defeat that showing only by producing evidence that raises a fact issue. Walker, 924 S.W.2d at 377; Haight v. Savoy Apartments, 814 S.W.2d 849, 851 (Tex. App.---Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
Retroactive Reinstatement --- Validity of Initial Contracts
A. Retroactivity of Reinstatements Following Suspensions for Nonpayment of Student Loans and Attorney-Occupation TaX
Robnett's first issue challenges the trial court's rulings by claiming that her reinstatements on October 30, 1998 and February 18, 2000 operated retroactively and therefore validated the contingency-fee contracts that she executed with her former clients in the Thomas and Trutec cases.
Robnett bases her contention that she was reinstated retroactively on article III, section 7 of the State Bar Rules. See State Bar R. art. III, § 7(A), reprinted in Tex. Gov't Code Ann., tit. 2, subtit. G app. A. Section III of the rules pertains only to membership in the bar and imposes a duty to pay membership fees. Id. art. III, § 3. Section 5 of article III provides for suspension of a member of the bar who is in default of payment of membership fees or any assessment levied by the Supreme Court of Texas and further provides that " ny practice of law during such suspension shall constitute professional misconduct and subject the member to discipline." Id. art. III, § 5. Section 7(A) of article III, however, provides that when an attorney remedies her suspension for nonpayment by removing the default, as provided in section 7, "the suspension shall automatically be lifted and the member restored to former status . . . retroactive to inception of suspension," but without affecting any disciplinary proceedings. Id. art. III, § 7(A); see Satterwhite v. State, 979 S.W.2d 626, 628-29 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). Article XII of the State Bar Rules contains similar provisions for retroactive reinstatement for suspensions premised on noncompliance with minimum continuing legal education requirements (MCLE). See State Bar R. art. XII, §§ 8, 10, reprinted in
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