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Robnett v. Kirklin Law Firm6/2/2005
Tex. Gov't Code Ann., tit. 2, subtit. G app. A (Vernon 2005).
Robnett concedes that she was suspended from the practice of law when she entered into the contingency-fee contracts for the Thomas and Trutec cases. She also recognizes that the suspensions on which the firm relied in challenging the validity of the contracts she assigned to the firm derive from her failure to pay her attorney-occupation tax and her lack of compliance with the Guaranteed Student Loan Program and were not premised on either nonpayment of dues and assessments required by article III of the State Bar Rules or on her noncompliance with the MCLE requirements imposed by article XII of the rules. Robnett argues, however, that her reinstatements after suspension for nonpayment of her attorney-occupation tax and student loans should also be treated as effecting retroactive reinstatement, in the same manner as reinstatements under article III, section 7(A) and article XII, section 10 of the State Bar Rules after suspension for nonpayment of dues and noncompliance with MCLE requirements. We disagree.
1. Reinstatement Following Suspension for Nonpayment of Attorney-Occupation Tax
Section 191.142 of the Tax Code imposes an annual tax of $200.00 on Texas lawyers, except those exempted by section 191.144. Tex. Tax Code Ann. §§ 191.142(a)-(b), 191.144(1)-(2) (Vernon 2002). The Tax Code requires the supreme court to administer the tax and authorizes the supreme court to suspend non-complying attorneys from the practice of law. Tex. Tax Code Ann §§ 191.1431, 1441(a) (Vernon 2002). The statute also authorizes reinstatement as follows: "An attorney who is suspended under Subsection (a) [of section 1441] shall be reinstated on payment of the tax and any interest and penalties." Id. In contrast to the State Bar Rules governing reinstatement following suspension for nonpayment of dues or noncompliance with MCLE requirements, the Tax Code does not provide for retroactive reinstatement after suspension for nonpayment of the attorney-occupation tax. Consistent with the Tax Code provisions, article III, section 8(g) of the State Bar Rules also provides for reinstatement of the attorney suspended for nonpayment of the attorney-occupation tax "on payment of the tax and any interest and penalties," but does not provide for retroactive reinstatement. State Bar R. art. III, § 8(g).
In construing a statute, we must presume that the Legislature intended the entire statute to be effective, and that it intended a just and reasonable result. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021(2), (3) (Vernon 2005) (Code Construction Act); see also Fleming Foods, Inc. v. Rylander, 6 S.W.3d 278, 284 (Tex. 1999) (noting, as "cardinal rule," that courts construing statutes give effect to intent of Legislature). In discerning legislative intent, we may presume that omissions in newly enacted statutes are intentional. In re Ament, 890 S.W.2d 39, 41 (Tex. 1994).
Robnett contends that the retroactivity provisions of article III, section 7(A) of the State Bar Rules should control here. We note, however, that under article III's default provisions, section 5, article III applies to "fees or any assessment levied by" the Supreme Court of Texas. State Bar R. art. III, § 5; see State Bar R. art. I (9) (defining "court"). Under the Tax Code, by contrast, the Legislature---not the supreme court---levies and assesses the attorney-occupation tax. See Tex. Tax Code Ann § 191.142(b) (Vernon 2002). The supreme court's role under the Tax Code, therefore, is limited to administering collection of tax. See Tex. Tax Code Ann § 191.1431; State Bar R. art. III, § 8.
Because neither the Tax Code nor the State Bar Rules provides for retroactive
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