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Robnett v. Kirklin Law Firm6/2/2005
reinstatement for suspensions arising from nonpayment of attorney-occupation tax, we conclude that the trial court correctly ruled that Robnett was not retroactively reinstated on October 30, 1998, when the contingency-fee contract in the Thomas case was signed. Because Robnett was thus still suspended from the practice of law when the Thomas contract was signed, she had no authority to enter into that contract.
2. Reinstatement Following Suspension for Nonpayment of Student Loans
In extending rule-making authority to the supreme court for licensing attorneys, the Legislature authorized the court to adopt rules "relating to the non-renewal of the license of a lawyer who is in default on a loan guaranteed under Chapter 57 [of the] Education Code, by the Texas Guaranteed Student Loan Corporation." Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 82.0222(c) (Vernon 2005). The rules enacted by the supreme court pursuant to this authority require suspension and state as follows:
Unless the attorney submits satisfactory evidence of compliance, or establishes error, the attorney's license is suspended. The court will remove the suspension upon presentation of satisfactory evidence that the attorney has entered a repayment agreement on the defaulted loan(s).
Order of the Supreme Court of Texas, June 18, 1996, 59 Tex. B. J. 844 (1996).
Like the Tax Code and article III, section 8(g) of the State Bar Rules, the supreme court's order has no provision for retroactive reinstatement. The supreme court's order imposes no "fees or assessments" that might, arguably, trigger the retroactivity provisions of article III, section 7(A), but simply effects suspension with no provision for retroactive reinstatement. We again conclude, therefore, that Robnett relies mistakenly on article III, section 7(A)'s retroactivity provision. See State Bar R. art. III, § 5, art. I (9).
We hold that the trial court correctly ruled that Robnett remained under suspension from the practice of law and was not retroactively reinstated on January 27, 2000, when the contingency-fee contract in the Trutec case was signed.
We overrule Robnett's first issue.
Right to Fees As a Matter of Law?
In her fourth issue, Robnett alternatively contends that she is entitled, as a matter of law, to recover attorney's fees under the contingency-fee contracts that she generated, despite being suspended from the practice of law when she signed them, pursuant to A.W. Wright & Assoc. v. Glover, Anderson, Chandler & Uzick, L.L.P., 993 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. App.---Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied) and Lee v. Cherry, 812 S.W.2d 361 (Tex. App.---Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied). Robnett's reliance on A.W. Wright and Lee is misplaced.
In A.W. Wright, our sister court recognized its prior holding in Lee, which upheld the rights of a disbarred attorney to receive attorney's fees negotiated before referring the case to a different law firm. Id. at 468 (citing Lee, 812 S.W.2d at 364). In Lee, the attorney seeking to enforce a referral-fee agreement had voluntarily resigned his law licence. See id. at 362. In each case, however, the attorney asserting a right to fees had completed his personal legal work on the case and relationship with the referred clients before becoming separated from the bar, by disbarrment in A.W. Wright, and by voluntary relinquishment in Lee. A.W. Wright, 939 S.W.2d at 469; Lee, 812 S.W.2d at 363. Here, by contrast, Robnett initiated both the Thomas and Trutec contracts while suspended from the bar. Accordingly, the rule first enunciated in Lee and reaffirmed in A.W. Wright does not apply.
We overrule Robnett's fourth issue.<
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