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Campos v. Nueces County4/14/2005
1998) (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.021(2) (Vernon 1997)). Proximate cause consists of both cause in fact and foreseeability. Travis v. City of Mesquite, 830 S.W.2d 94, 98 (Tex. 1992). Cause in fact means that the condition was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury which would not otherwise have occurred. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Jefferson Assocs., 896 S.W.2d 156, 161 (Tex. 1995).
Having reviewed the pleadings liberally in favor of jurisdiction, we conclude that appellants intend to prove that the premises defects were a substantial factor in bringing about injuries that would not have otherwise occurred. See Peek, 779 S.W.2d at 804. Appellants have alleged that the defects permitted guards to have unlimited, unmonitored access to inmates, provided the seclusion necessary for the harassment and assaults to occur, and prevented any reasonable opportunity for appellants to escape. Appellants also claim that their injuries were foreseeable by appellee. Based on these pleadings, we conclude that appellants have not simply alleged that the defects furnished a mere condition that made their injuries possible. See Bossley, 968 S.W.2d at 343. The nexus between the alleged premises defects and injuries in this case is not so highly attenuated that it defies the definition of proximate cause. Accordingly, we conclude that appellants' petition affirmatively demonstrates the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court by asserting a cause of action for premises defects against appellee under the tort claims act. In reaching this holding, we emphasize that the purpose of a "plea [to the jurisdiction] is not to force the plaintiffs to preview their case on the merits but to establish a reason why the merits of the plaintiffs' claims should never be reached." Bland, 34 S.W.3d at 554. Neither this Court nor the trial court is authorized to inquire so far into the substance of the claims presented that appellants would be required to put on their case simply to establish jurisdiction. See id. Nothing in this opinion should be construed as either favoring or disfavoring the theory advanced by appellants, except that their theory is sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the court regardless of whether it is ultimately successful.
ii. Use of Tangible Personal Property
Appellants also claim that their injuries were caused by the use of tangible personal property; however, this allegation remains largely undeveloped. The only personal property identified in appellants' live petition are surveillance cameras, which the petition alleges were either non-functioning or misplaced. Such allegations scarcely amount to the "use" of personal property required by the tort claims act. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.021(2). According to the supreme court, "use" means "to put or bring into action or service; to employ for or apply to a given purpose." LeLeaux v. Hamshire-Fannett Ind. Sch. Dist., 835 S.W.2d 49, 51 (Tex. 1992). Construing appellants' petition liberally, it appears to allege that appellee employed security cameras at the facility used by the SATF for the purpose of monitoring inmates, as well as guards, and that appellee's employment of cameras that were either non-functioning or misplaced for the purpose of surveillance proximately caused the injuries sustained by appellants. Although we cannot conclude that such allegations affirmatively negate the possibility of jurisdiction, they are insufficient to demonstrate jurisdiction. Accordingly, appellants must be afforded an opportunity to amend their pleadings. See Brown, 80 S.W.3d at 549. To demonstrate jurisdiction sufficiently, the allegations of appellants' petition must detail how appellee used the ca
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