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Pringle v. Moon2/10/2005
In this personal injury case, Helen Pringle, as independent executrix of the estate of Brantley Pringle, appeals from a judgment for Toby Moon. In two issues, Helen contends that the trial court erred in applying the wrong prejudgment interest rate and in calculating prejudgment interest on the damages found by the jury rather than on the judgment amount. We will reverse the part of the judgment relating to prejudgment interest and remand to the trial court to recalculate prejudgment interest in accordance with this opinion.
On July 18, 2000, Brantley was driving in Parker County when he came upon a construction zone where Moon was working with tree removal equipment. Brantley's car struck a piece of equipment, which pushed Moon into another piece of equipment and caused him to sustain injuries. Because Moon sustained his injuries in the course and scope of his employment, he sought and received workers' compensation insurance benefits totaling $39,430.69 from Texas Mutual Insurance Company (Texas Mutual). Brantley filed suit against Moon, and Moon counterclaimed.
Before trial, Texas Mutual asserted a right to recovery of benefits paid to Moon. Brantley's liability insurance carrier, GEICO, then entered into an agreement with Texas Mutual whereby, in exchange for GEICO's cash payment, Texas Mutual assigned to GEICO Texas Mutual's right to recovery of the statutory workers' compensation lien in the amount of $39,430.69. GEICO then assigned to Brantley the subrogation recovery interest Texas Mutual had previously assigned to GEICO.
The case was tried to a jury in Parker County in June 2003. At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury returned a verdict finding Brantley negligent and liable to Moon for $44,243.06. The trial court rendered judgment on the verdict on July 7, 2003. Thereafter, Brantley filed a motion to modify the judgment because it did not reflect the amount of his workers' compensation lien. On August 20, 2003, the trial court granted Brantley's motion and vacated the July 7 judgment.
Brantley died suddenly on September 2, 2003. Helen, as independent executrix of Brantley's estate, was substituted as a party on October 24, 2003.
The trial court rendered a final judgment on October 30, 2003, allowing the credit for Brantley's workers' compensation lien and calculating prejudgment interest at the rate of ten percent per annum on the entire amount of damages found by the jury. Helen filed a motion to modify both the interest rate and the interest calculation in the judgment, which was overruled by operation of law. This appeal followed.
In her first issue, Helen contends that the trial court erred in applying the wrong prejudgment interest rate to the damages award. Helen argues that the correct prejudgment interest rate was the greater of five percent or the prime interest rate in effect when the final judgment was signed. Moon contends that the final judgment was signed July 7, 2003, that the October 30 judgment was merely a judgment nunc pro tunc, and that the trial court properly determined that the applicable interest rate is ten percent.
The prejudgment interest rate is controlled by statute. See Tex. Fin. Code Ann. ยงยง 304.003, 304.103 (Vernon Supp. 2004-05). Because statutory construction is a question of law, we review the trial court's decision de novo. Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Needham, 82 S.W.3d 314, 318 (Tex. 2002); Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates, L.P., 71 S.W.3d 18, 26 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2002, no pet.). Under a de novo standard of review, the reviewing court exercises its own judgment and redetermines each legal issue. Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan Inc., 84 S.W.3d 2
Page 1 2 3 Texas Personal Injury Attorneys
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