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Mills v. Warner Lambert Co.2/11/2005
This case involves an interlocutory appeal of a class-certification order. The primary issue is whether the portions of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) regulating nonprescription drugs deprived the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction to hear claims regarding the efficacy of certain head-lice remedies. The court of appeals concluded that the FDCA preempted the class's state-law claims and deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to enter its class-certification order. We disagree with the court of appeals' conclusion that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Ordinary preemption operates as an affirmative defense to a plaintiff's state-law claims but does not deprive state courts of jurisdiction over those claims. State-court jurisdiction is affected only when Congress requires that claims be addressed exclusively in a federal forum. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 242-45 (1959).
In this case, we conclude that the FDCA provision at issue is not one of the few statutes that require claims to be resolved exclusively in a federal forum. The relevant section of the FDCA contains no forum-preempting language and indicates no intent to vest exclusive jurisdiction in a federal forum. We therefore conclude that the FDCA did not deprive the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. Because this is an interlocutory appeal, only the question of subject matter jurisdiction is before us at this time; consequently, we do not decide whether the FDCA would, through ordinary preemption, provide a full defense to the plaintiffs' claims. We reverse the court of appeals' judgment and remand the case to that court for consideration of the other issues raised on appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 59.1.
The petitioners in this case are plaintiffs suing six pharmaceutical companies for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability of certain over-the-counter head-lice remedies. The plaintiffs argue that, as lice strains have developed resistance to the active ingredient in the companies' products, those products are no longer capable of effectively treating head-lice infestations and are therefore unfit for their ordinary purpose. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 2.314(b)(3). The plaintiffs sought breach-of-warranty damages under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE §§ 17.46(b), 17.50(a)(1). The defendants moved for summary judgment in the trial court, arguing that the FDCA preempted the plaintiffs' claims. The plaintiffs filed a cross-motion, asking the trial court to rule as a matter of law that the claims were not preempted. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion and struck the defendants' affirmative defense of federal preemption. The trial court subsequently certified a class of Texas consumers and adopted a trial plan. The pharmaceutical companies then brought this interlocutory appeal challenging the class-certification order. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE§ 51.014(3).
Before examining whether the trial court's certification order complied with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 42, the court of appeals first considered whether the trial court had jurisdiction to enter the certification order at all. 117 S.W.3d 488, 490; see McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Cortez, 66 S.W.3d 227, 231 (Tex. 2001) (stating that "the interlocutory appeal statute does not supplant the constitutional requirement that the court of appeals have subject-matter jurisdiction"); Pearson v. State, 315 S.W.2d 935, 938 (Tex. 1958) (" he jurisdiction of the appellate court as to the merits of a case extends no further than that of the court from which the appeal is taken.").
The court of appeals concluded that federal law preempted
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