 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Tindley v. Salt Lake City School District5/17/2005
that "the scope of the protections afforded by article I, section 11 [have] to be viewed in light of the immunities that were recognized when the Utah Constitution was adopted," including "governmental immunity." Id. at 435; see also Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627, 629 (Utah 1983) ("Article I, § 11 worked no change in the principle of sovereign immunity, and sovereign immunity is not unconstitutional under that section.").
In addition, the mere fact that legislation abrogates an existing legal remedy does not render it impermissible under the open courts clause. Such legislation is acceptable under Berry so long as it either "provides an injured person an effective and reasonable alternative remedy" or seeks to eliminate "a clear social or economic evil." 717 P.2d at 680. With respect to the second alternative, "the [abrogation] of an existing legal remedy [cannot be] an arbitrary or unreasonable means for achieving the objective." Id.
The District argues that the doctrine of sovereign immunity rendered it immune from suit prior to the passage of the Act. Accordingly, it reasons that the Act could not have abrogated any "existing remedy" in violation of the open courts clause. Plaintiffs urge us to reject this conclusion for two reasons. First, plaintiffs argue that the doctrine of sovereign immunity was not part of Utah law at the time the Utah Constitution was adopted. Second, even assuming that sovereign immunity was part of Utah law, they assert that it protected governmental entities only when those entities were performing activities constituting a governmental function, Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, 36, 5 P.3d 616, and that transporting students to an out-of-state, extracurricular debate tournament does not qualify as such. We decline plaintiffs' invitation to revisit the historical evolution of sovereign immunity under Utah law because we conclude that the District would have been entitled to immunity for its activity in this case prior to the adoption of the Act.
Before the enactment of the Act in 1965, governmental entities were afforded immunity to the extent that their activities qualified as governmental functions. See id. (noting that prior to the Act's enactment, "governmental activities deemed to be proprietary were not immune and governmental activities deemed to be 'governmental' as opposed to proprietary were immune"). With certain exceptions, the Act codified this view of sovereign immunity, providing all governmental entities immunity for "the exercise of a governmental function." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3(1); see Greenhalgh v. Payson City, 530 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah 1975) ("It seems plain enough that the intent of [the Act] was to retain the then existing law, both as to immunity and as to liability . . . ."), superseded on other grounds by Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-36(1) (Supp. 1975). However, because the Act did not define "governmental function," the question of whether an activity fell within the scope of the Act rested with the courts. See Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah 1980), superseded by Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(4)(a) (1987). This changed in 1987 when the legislature amended the Act, defining a governmental function as follows: any act, failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking of a governmental entity whether or not the act, failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking is characterized as governmental, proprietary, a core governmental function, unique to government, undertaken in a dual capacity, essential to or not essential to a government or governmental function, or could be performed by private enterprise or private persons.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(4)(a).
The 1987 amendm
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Utah Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|