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Tindley v. Salt Lake City School District5/17/2005
ent substantively expanded the scope of immunity established by the Act, providing immunity for activities that were once deemed proprietary and, therefore, had not been covered by immunity under the common law. See Laney, 2002 UT 79 at 53 ("By defining a governmental function as any act of a governmental entity, whether or not the activity is characterized as governmental or proprietary, the 1987 amendment effectively grants immunity protection for some activities that were formerly considered proprietary and were not entitled to immunity."). Accordingly, to determine whether the Act, or its 1987 amendment, "abrogates a cause of action existing at the time of its enactment," id. at 50, we must determine whether plaintiffs would have had a right to bring their cause of action against the District at any time prior to 1987. If not, the Act does not abrogate an existing remedy, thereby terminating our analysis. If, however, plaintiffs would have been able to bring suit against the District prior to 1987, we must then determine whether the Act's abrogation of that cause of action is permissible under Berry.
Our jurisprudence has established a distinct test, based on our opinion in Standiford, for determining whether the Act in its current form abrogates a cause of action that existed prior to its enactment. Under this test, we assess whether the activity giving rise to the cause of action is "'of such a unique nature that it can only be performed by a governmental agency or that . . . is essential to the core of governmental immunity.'" Laney, 2002 UT 79 at 52 (quoting Standiford, 605 P.2d at 1236-37); see Lyon, 2000 UT 19 at 35 (recognizing that the Standiford test "reflect the proper constitutional boundary between those governmental activities that" implicate the open courts clause and those that do not).
We previously have noted that the Standiford test must be applied with a "degree of flexibility" in order to take into account the "significant differences between different kinds of governmental activities." DeBry, 889 P.2d at 440. Thus, in applying this test, we must, "'among other things, evaluate whether the effect of tort liability would promote public safety or defeat essential or core governmental activities and programs that are critical to the protection of public safety and welfare.'" Lyon, 2000 UT 19 at 39 (quoting DeBry, 889 P.2d at 440). In our previous applications of the Standiford test, we have concluded, for example, that a city's "operation and maintenance of a municipal electrical power system" was not sufficiently unique to have qualified for immunity under the pre-1987 version of the Act, Laney, 2002 UT 79 at 22-53; "that fire fighting activities are an essential and core governmental activity," Lyon, 2000 UT 19 at 42; and that a city's "operation of a public golf course is not essential to governing," Standiford, 605 P.2d at 1237.
We have long recognized the essential nature of public schools' educational activities. See Bingham v. Bd. of Educ., 223 P.2d 432, 434 (Utah 1950) (recognizing that school districts act "'on behalf of the state in discharging the duty of educating the children of school age in the public schools created by general laws'" (quoting Woodcock v. Bd. of Educ., 187 P. 181, 183 (Utah 1920))). While the act of providing classroom instruction lies at the heart of a school district's function, any supplemental activities that are necessary to sustain this function must similarly be subject to the same rule. This principle is consistent with our previous recognition that the scope of a school board's immunity, prior to the enactment of the Act, extended to its operation of an incinerator to dispose of garbage collected on scho
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