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Tindley v. Salt Lake City School District5/17/2005
ol grounds. Id. at 438.
Here, we are unwilling to conclude that a school's operation of an extracurricular student debate team, including its transport of the team to and from out-of-state competitions, falls outside the realm of a school district's core activities. Such an activity clearly benefits student education and is unlikely to be available to public school students if not offered through their schools. Moreover, imposing tort liability on a school district for the operation of such activities is more likely to deter schools from offering them than to promote public safety. We note that other jurisdictions have consistently held that similar extracurricular activities fall within the scope of a public school's traditional governmental immunity. See, e.g., Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 527 (Ky. 2001) (interscholastic athletics); Churilla v. Sch. Dist., 306 N.W.2d 381, 381 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (football program); McManus v. Anahuac Indep. Sch. Dist., 667 S.W.2d 275, 278 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (school-sponsored bonfire and pep rally).
We conclude that school districts have always enjoyed governmental immunity for the operation of such programs as the one at issue. Thus, the Act did not in any way limit or abrogate a right to recover from the District. See McCorvey v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 868 P.2d 41, 48 (Utah 1993) ("Because no right existed at common law to recover from the state for injuries arising out of the state's maintenance of public roadways, the legislature is free to limit the state's liability in that area without implicating the open courts clause . . . ."). Accordingly, we hold that the Act's limitation on damages does not violate the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution.
II. UNIFORM OPERATION OF LAWS AND DUE PROCESS UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
We now address whether the Act violates either the uniform operation of laws provision, article I, section 24, or the due process provision, article I, section 7, of the Utah Constitution. Because both provisions seek to accomplish the same objective, namely, to ensure that legislation is "rationally related to the accomplishment of some legitimate state purpose," our analysis of the two provisions will contain "[considerable] overlap." Condemarin v. Univ. Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 356 (Utah 1989) (internal quotations omitted).
When evaluating a challenge under the uniform operation of laws provision, commonly referred to as Utah's equal protection clause, we subject statutory classifications that involve fundamental rights or suspect classifications to a "heightened degree of scrutiny." Utah Safe to Learn-Safe to Worship Coalition, Inc. v. State, 2004 UT 32, 31, 94 P.3d 217. Additionally, we review statutory classifications that implicate rights protected by the open courts clause under "heightened scrutiny." Judd, 2004 UT 91 at 19; see also Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 580-82 (Utah 1993) (holding that "a standard of scrutiny stricter than the rational-basis standard governed when a discrimination implicated a right protected by the open courts provision"). However, when a statute does not create a suspect classification and implicates neither a fundamental right nor a right protected by the open courts clause, we will subject that statute to a lower level of scrutiny, analyzing the statute to determine "'(1) whether the classification is reasonable, (2) whether the legislative objectives are legitimate, and (3) whether there is a reasonable relationship between the two.'" Peterson v. Coca-Cola USA, 2002 UT 42, 23, 48 P.3d 941 (quoting Ryan v. Gold Cross Servs., Inc., 903 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1995)).
Si
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