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State v. Merrill6/10/2005
ut express constitutional protection. We express no opinion concerning whether some scheme affording defendants the opportunity to challenge their guilty pleas through a means other than direct appeal is constitutionally required. We agree with Mr. Merrill that some access to the courts for the purpose of reviewing the lawfulness of a guilty plea is a fundamental right. Unlike Mr. Merrill, we do not consider fundamental a defendant's right to maintain a perpetual grip on all procedural levers to withdraw a guilty plea. In our view, the relief provided by section 77-13-6 to tardy plea withdrawal applicants through the PCRA is adequate to justify the disparate treatment of defendants in Mr. Merrill's classification.
We may quickly dispatch Mr. Merrill's contention that it takes longer for a defendant to pursue post-conviction relief than direct appeal. He traces this alleged disability to Utah Code section 78-35a-106(1), which prohibits a person from pursuing post-conviction relief on any ground that may be raised on direct appeal. Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106(1) (2002). We do not concede that the pursuit of post-conviction remedies is necessarily a longer process than a direct appeal. Mr. Merrill has offered no data to support his claim, nor does Mr. Merrill risk delay in seeking PCRA relief while his direct appeal is pending. The thirty-day window to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea ran in tandemwith the thirty-day period to file a notice of appeal. He filed neither within the permitted time. Thus, there was no direct appeal that could delay Mr. Merrill's PCRA petition.
The absence of a right to counsel to seek PCRA relief similarly fails to jeopardize the constitutionality of section 77-13-6. The PCRA expressly authorizes district courts to appoint counsel on a pro bono basis to a defendant pursuing post-conviction relief. Id. § 78-35a-109. While not guaranteeing appointed counsel, the PCRA does not deny defendants access to counsel. Mr. Merrill has made no demonstration that PCRA petitioners like himself, who seek to withdraw guilty pleas, are generally, or ever, required to pursue their claims unaided by counsel. Thus, we cannot conclude that defendants who seek post-conviction relief are denied operational uniformity of the laws in this matter. Mr. Merrill's personal experience clearly fails to advance his cause. He has enjoyed the benefit of skilled pro bono counsel before this court. If the work of Mr. Merrill's counsel before us is in any way representative of the quality of advocacy afforded members of Mr. Merrill's class, the PCRA scheme for providing access to counsel impartsno hardship on defendants. Thus, we conclude that Utah Code section 77-13-6(2)(b) violates neither the equal protection provision of the United States Constitution nor the uniform operation of laws provision of the Utah Constitution.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that the thirty-day limit for withdrawal of a guilty plea imposed by Utah Code section 77-13-6(2)(b) creates a constitutionally permissible jurisdictional bar. Accordingly, we affirm the ruling of the district court.
Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief Justice Wilkins, Justice Durrant, and Justice Parrish concur in Justice Nehring's opinion.
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