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State v. Merrill6/10/2005
f to be unconstitutional. Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249, 253 (Utah 1998). In Julian, we used the open courts provision to reject legislative attempts to impose time limits on defendants who seek to access habeas corpus relief. Id. We reasoned that the right to a habeas corpus petition is a right bestowed by the judicial branch not subject to legislation. Id. In a concurring opinion, Justice Zimmerman wrote that the time limitations imposed on filing habeas actions were offensive because of the writ's place as "one of the cornerstones of Anglo-American jurisprudence and an essential constitutional tool we give every citizen so that they can raise challenges to the lawfulness of their confinements." Id. at 259 (Zimmerman, J., concurring); see also Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1033 (Utah 1989) (explaining the writ of habeas corpus). Because it serves as essentially the last resort for persons wrongfully deprived of their liberty, the right to seek habeas corpus can never be extinguished by the mere passage of time. Julian, 966 P.2d at 254.
Mr. Merrill contends that the right to petition to withdraw a guilty plea is the equivalent of a habeas corpus petition. He argues that the legislature has no more authority to limit the time to file a motion seeking to withdraw a guilty plea than to impose filing deadlines on habeas corpus petitions. Mr. Merrill's argument relies on the fundamental assumption that a motion to withdraw a guilty plea has the same legal valence as a habeas corpus petition. This assumption is false. Although a defendant's right to attempt to withdraw his guilty plea is an important one, its place within the framework of our system of justice cannot reasonably be compared to the stature of the habeas corpus petition. The "great writ" of habeas corpus has earned recognition and protection within our constitution. Utah Const. art. I, § 5 ("The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety requires it."). The right to withdraw a guilty plea has not. Moreover, unlike the writ of habeas corpus, a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is not a last resort. This fact is made clear within the text of the current version of Utah Code section 77-13-6. Immediately following section 77-13-6(2)(b), which imposes the thirty-day filing limit, section 77-13-6(2)(c) preserves the right of a defendant to pursue challenges to the lawfulness of his guilty plea under both the Post-Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA") and Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65C, provisions that embody the elements of the traditional writ of habeas corpus. Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(c) (Supp. 2004).
Thus, although the thirty-day filing limit is jurisdictional, it does not foreclose a court from taking up the merits of a defendant's challenge to his guilty plea. Mr. Merrill has not presented us with any reason to extend the same dignity we bestow on a habeas corpus petition to a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. Without congruence between a motion to withdraw a guilty plea and a habeas corpus petition, and we find none, Mr. Merrill's open courts argument fails.
B. Separation of Powers
Mr. Merrill's separation of powers argument appears to have much in common with his open courts claim. Like the open courts provision, the separation of powers provision found in article V, section 1 of the Utah Constitution imposes a limit on legislative power. Utah Const. art. V, § 1. Mr. Merrill again attempts to align a petition for habeas corpus with a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. In this instance, he argues that because we have previously held that the authority to shape the procedural elements of habeas corpus is vested exclusively in the jud
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