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State v. Merrill6/10/2005
icial branch, Julian, 922 P.2d at 253, we should similarly limit the legislature's power to define the procedural elements of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. Because section 77-13-6 is a product of legislative action, Mr. Merrill argues that it violates the separation of powers provision. However, as discussed above, infra part IIA, the dissimilarity between the two forms of relief dooms Mr. Merrill's separation of powers challenge, just as it undermined his open courts challenge.
C. Due Process
Due process requires that "the defendant receive full notice of the charges, the elements, how the defendant's conduct amounts to a crime, the consequences of the plea, etc." Salazar v. Utah State Prison, 852 P.2d 988, 991 (Utah 1993). The requirement that a guilty plea be both knowing and voluntary to be valid further refines the "full notice" mandate and thereby implicates due process. The United States Supreme Court has held that due process as required by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution can be obtained by a meaningful opportunity for a hearing. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 437 (1982).
Mr. Merrill contends that he did not enter a voluntary and knowing plea because he was suffering from religious delusions brought on as a side effect of his medicine, Zoloft. A jurisdictional bar on untimely motions to withdraw guilty pleas, he argues, denies him and similarly situated defendants "a means by which they can reappear before the [district] court and have these due process rights enforced." This element of Mr. Merrill's argument injects a second and ultimately more relevant due process consideration into his claim. While an unknowing or involuntary guilty plea is likely to constitute a denial of due process, an absolute prohibition against providing a forum to a defendant in which he may assert defects in his guilty plea would certainly violate constitutional due process guarantees.
Section 77-13-6 does not create an absolute bar, but according to Mr. Merrill it nevertheless unconstitutionally impedes his opportunity to bring his claim that his plea was not knowing and voluntary before a court. We disagree. Section 77-13-6 provides two opportunities to challenge the validity of a guilty plea: a motion to withdraw the plea, which must be brought within the thirty-day statutory window, and an action for post-conviction relief, which may be brought after the expiration of the thirty-day statutory period. Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (Supp. 2004). Thus, section 77-13-6 provides a meaningful opportunity for a hearing before the district court, regardless of whether the thirty-day limit was met. This statutory scheme satisfies the demands of due process.
D. Equal Protection & Uniform Operation of Laws
Finally, we review Mr. Merrill's equal protection claims. Mr. Merrill seeks to invalidate section 77-13-6(2)(b) under the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution and the uniform operation of laws provision of the Utah Constitution. The two provisions are substantially parallel. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."); Utah Const. art. I, § 24 ("All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation."); see also Anderson v. Provo City, 2005 UT 5, 17-18, 108 P.3d 701 (stating that the two provisions embody the same general principles, although under some circumstances, Utah's uniform operation of laws provision is more rigorous than the federal equal protection clause). Under each, we must determine what classifications are created by the statute, whether they are treated disparately, and whethe
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