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State v. Merrill6/10/2005
r the disparate treatment serves a reasonable government objective. State v. Schofield, 2002 UT 132, 12, 63 P.3d 667. Because our analysis under the uniform operation of laws provision is at least as rigorous as it would be under the federal equal protection provision, we limit our review to Mr. Merrill's state constitutional claims.
According to Mr. Merrill, section 77-13-6(2) unconstitutionally discriminates against a class of defendants who delay their attempts to withdraw guilty pleas after the statutory thirty-day deadline has passed. He reasons that these defendants are substantially disadvantaged when compared to defendants who timely file motions to withdraw their pleas because section 77-13-6(2) imposes disparate treatment on the two classes in two ways: (1) those who meet the deadline "can obtain immediate relief," while those who do not meet the deadline must remain incarcerated while they "exhaust appellate remedies" before seeking post-conviction relief through the PCRA; and (2) defendants seeking post-conviction relief are not guaranteed the benefit of appointed counsel because the PCRA permits courts to appoint counsel on a pro bono basis but does not require it, see Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-109(1) (2002). We are not persuaded that this statutory scheme violates the uniform operation of laws provision.
Article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution provides: "All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation." Utah Const. art. I, § 24. Operational uniformity, in turn, requires that persons similarly situated be treated similarly. Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 670 (Utah 1984). We have adopted a two-part test to measure whether a statute meets this standard: "First, a law must apply equally to all persons within a class. Second, the statutory classifications and the different treatment given the classes must be based on differences that have a reasonable tendency to further the objective of the statute." Id. (citations omitted); accord Schofield, 2002 UT 132 at 12; State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 997 (Utah 1995); Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah 1989).
The first component of our assessment model presupposes that the statute creates classifications, casting its net over some persons based on their status or conduct while excluding others. We long ago noted that the creation of classes and the discrimination among them is inherent to all laws:
" very legislative act is in one sense discriminatory. The Legislature cannot in one act legislate as to all persons or all subject matters. It is inclusive as to some class or group and as to some human relationships, transactions, or functions and exclusive as to the remainder. For that reason, to be unconstitutional the discrimination must be unreasonable or arbitrary. A classification is never unreasonable or arbitrary in its inclusion or exclusion features so long as there is some basis for the differentiation between classes or subject matters included as compared to those excluded from its operation, provided the differentiation bears a reasonable relation to the purposes to be accomplished by the act."
Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 577 n.6 (Utah 1993) (quoting State v. Mason, 94 Utah 501, 507, 78 P.2d 920, 923 (Utah 1938)).
In its broadest sense, section 77-13-6(2) classifies persons on the basis of their relationship to the criminal justice system. It reaches only those persons who have pleaded guilty to criminal offenses and excludes both persons who are not defendants in any criminal proceeding and defendants in criminal actions who did not enter guilty pleas.
Within the class of defendants who enter guilty pleas, sectio
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