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Maine Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Tinker3/16/2005
3 VT 33, 13, 175 Vt. 212, 824 A.2d 572. In particular, Tinker calls attention to the following language: "The reasonable expectations of the parties are important in considering the scope of coverage provided in insurance contracts because such contracts, largely adhesive in nature, often contain boilerplate terms that are not bargained for, not read, and not understood by the insureds." Id. (quotations omitted) (emphasis added). This language only underscores the point, however, that the insured's coverage expectations must be reasonable, otherwise a willfully ignorant policy holder might claim coverage for all manner of explicitly excluded damages. Here, Tinker was well aware of the coverage that professional liability insurance could provide, and he chose to drop that coverage in the belief that he was judgment proof. It is unreasonable to then expect a business liability policy - adhesive or not - to provide coverage for damages arising from actions he undertook based on judgments he made as a professional surveyor when the policy explicitly excludes coverage for professional services. Concord General, therefore, lends nothing to Tinker's cause.
10. A trial court may grant judgment as a matter of law "at any time before submission of the case to the jury, if the [nonmoving] party's claim cannot be maintained under controlling law." Gero, 171 Vt. at 59, 757 A.2d at 476 (quotations and citations omitted); accord V.R.C.P. 50(a). Here, Tinker does not dispute that the damages for which he seeks coverage arose from his rendering of professional services, and his policy clearly and unambiguously excludes coverage under these circumstances. It was unreasonable, therefore, for him to expect coverage in this case. Accordingly, there is no legal basis for his claims, and the trial court should have entered judgment as a matter of law in favor of Maine Mutual. Given our disposition of this issue, we do not reach the other arguments raised on appeal.
Reversed.
John A. Dooley, Associate Justice
Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice
Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice
Paul L. Reiber, Associate Justice
Frederic W. Allen, Chief Justice (Ret.), Specially Assigned
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