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State v. Siddiq6/27/2005
a case where anyone is arguing that there is a lack of sufficiency of the evidence in terms of the defendant not intending to shoot. As I said again in the questioning of counsel, clearly in this case there was no question presented to the jury that the intention was anything other than intentional. There was no claim of accident. There was no claim that the discharge was anything other than intentional. Rather, the claim was that the defendant acted in self-defense and that this was justifiable. Therefore, the intentional act was justifiable.
The question in my mind is a narrow one, and that is, as a matter of law, can the intent that is found in the Instructions 14 and 15, in terms of manslaughter, be sufficient to allow a conviction on count one and count two?
It seems to me that it is sufficient to allow a transfer of intent. And even though I recognize the harsh consequences of the ruling, I'm bound to interpret the law as I see it, and, therefore, I'll deny the motion to arrest judgment and/or dismiss.
A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for a new trial will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is predicated on erroneous interpretations of the law or constitutes an abuse of discretion. State v. Jackman, 113 Wn.2d 772, 777, 783 P.2d 580 (1989).
Siddiq assaulted Young and Wiggins by actual battery. Unlike the other methods of assault recognized in Washington, assault by actual battery Sdoes not require specific intent to inflict harm or cause apprehension; rather, battery requires intent to do the physical act constituting assault.' State v. Hall, 104 Wn. App. 56, 62, 14 P.3d 884 (2000). Here the physical act constituting the assault was the firing of the handgun, and it is undisputed that Siddiq intended to shoot Jimicum. Siddiq's position was that his actions were justifiable as self-defense, not that the shooting was unintentional.
Siddiq's argument assumes that the jury, in finding that he recklessly caused the death of Jimicum, necessarily found no more. But recklessness is also established if a person acts intentionally or knowingly, RCW 9A.08.010(2), and the jury was so instructed. The jury could have found that Siddiq acted with the intent to shoot - but not with intent to kill as required for second-degree murder - yet still find him guilty of first-degree manslaughter. His intention to shoot could then apply both to the manslaughter of Jimicum and to his accidental shooting of Young and Wiggins, properly resulting in his second-degree assault convictions.
Moreover, Siddiq can make this argument only because the jury convicted him of manslaughter instead of second-degree murder. In effect, he is making an inconsistent verdicts argument after all. In Washington, consistency between verdicts on several counts of an indictment is unnecessary where a defendant is convicted of some counts but acquitted on others. While inconsistent verdicts 'present a situation where 'error,' in the sense that the jury has not followed the court's instructions, most certainly has occurred such inconsistencies often are a product of jury lenity.' State v. Ng, 110 Wn.2d 32, 45, 750 P.2d 632 (1988) (quoting United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 65, 105 S. Ct. 471, 83 L. Ed. 2d 461 (1984)). If the jury's verdict of guilt on one count is supported by sufficient evidence from which it could rationally find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, this court will not reverse on grounds that the guilty verdict is inconsistent with an acquittal on another count. Ng, 110 Wn.2d at 48.
There is sufficient evidence to support the conviction if a rational trier of fact could find each element of the crime proven beyond a reasona
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