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State v. Siddiq6/27/2005
20 (1994). In that case, Wilson, after being barred from entering a local tavern, returned to the tavern and shot several bullets through the tavern's large plate glass window. The State charged Wilson with first-degree assault of four individuals - two women he had intended to shoot, as evidenced by the verbal threats he made to them earlier, and two unintended victims. Wilson, 125 Wn.2d at 215. The jury convicted Wilson of all four assault charges.
The Court of Appeals reversed the two convictions against the unintended victims, reasoning that the doctrine of transferred intent did not apply under the assault statutes if the defendant successfully assaulted the intended victim. State v. Wilson, 71 Wn. App. 880, 863 P.2d 116 (1993). The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the convictions. The Court held that the first degree assault statute literally provides that once the intent to inflict great bodily harm is established, the statute, not the doctrine of transferred intent, allows that intent to apply to unintended victims: 'It is RCW 9A.36.011, not the doctrine of transferred intent, which provides: intent against one is intent against all.' Wilson, 125 Wn.2d at 214. 'Transferred intent is only required when a criminal statute matches specific intent with a specific victim. RCW 9A.36.011 does not include such a rigid requirement.' Wilson, 125 Wn.2d at 219.
The State charged Siddiq with assaulting Young, Wiggins, and Gogo with a deadly weapon, one means of committing second-degree assault. One who 'assaults another with a deadly weapon' is guilty of that crime. The second degree murder statute discussed in Wilson refers to causing 'the death of such person or of a third person', RCW 9A.32.050(1)(a). According to Siddiq, the omission of a reference to 'a third person' in the assault statute means that the Legislature intended a different interpretation for the assault statute. We disagree. 'Another' is not more specific than 'a third person'. Despite the slight variation in terms, we conclude Wilson controls the analysis of this issue because the statute in question does not match a specific intent to a specific victim.
Once Siddiq's intent to fire the handgun was established, as was required to prove assault by actual battery, the statute itself allowed this intent to apply to the shooting of Young and Wiggins, the unintended victims. Instruction 25 was correct because the jury did not have to find that Siddiq specifically intended to assault them.
Siddiq argues in passing that the jury may have improperly relied on transferred intent in convicting him of assault on Sonja Gogo at the roadside where, as he was attempting to leave the scene, he either tried to shoot her or fired warning shots in the air. The instruction on that particular count informed the jury that it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that 'the defendant assaulted Sonja Gogo with a deadly weapon'. Siddiq does not explain how the jury's deliberations could have been misled on the count involving Gogo. The appellate court will not consider issues that are inadequately briefed. State v. Dennison, 115 Wn.2d 609, 629, 801 P.2d 193 (1990).
SELF DEFENSE INSTRUCTION
Siddiq contends Instruction 26, on justifiable homicide, was defective because it did not allow the jury to consider his right to act upon reasonable appearances in a multiple-assailant attack. He contends the instruction should have said the homicide was justifiable if he reasonably believed that Jimicum, or others who he reasonably believed were acting in concert with Jimicum, intended to inflict death or great personal injury. Because Siddiq requested the self-defense instruction that he now challenges, he invit
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