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Coblentz v. Rorem6/14/2005
w he applies it.
The trial court erred at least in part in originally calculating Rorem's fees and Dora's recovery. In fact, the court entered contradictory numbers calculating Dora's recovery at $80,500 at one point, at $87,667 at another, and at $86,500 at yet another. Rorem recognized the court's error; he also recognized that under the fee agreement, he owed Dora another $4,800 in fees. He was correct. And his law of the case argument affords no escape from his contractual obligations to Dora. First, we test the validity of the note, principally whether consideration supports it by conditions at the time the note was executed. See RCW 62A.3-303(b) (If a negotiable instrument is not issued for consideration, the maker has a defense to the obligation to pay on it.). Accordingly, if consideration supported the note when Rorem executed it, the note is enforceable. When Rorem executed the note, he owed Dora approximately $4,800 under their fee agreement. This obligation and debt provides consideration for the note. RCW 62A.3-303(b) (If an instrument is issued for value, there is consideration.); see also, RCW 62A.3-303, cmt. 1. And none of the muddle as to numbers, including our own contribution to the confusion, changed Rorem's obligation to Dora. Moreover, once he recognized the mistake in calculations, Rorem should have moved to correct the court's error in calculating Dora's share. If he had, this case would have been long since concluded and Dora would have the money she is entitled to under her fee agreement with Rorem.
Second, we expressly said in 2003 that '{t}he promissory note was not before us on the prior appeal. We did not and do not make any decision on the enforceability of this note.' Exh. 10. In our original decision, we incorporated the trial court's wrong number. And we refused to correct the error not because of the merits of the question but because Dora had not timely moved to correct it.
II. Enforceability of the Note
We will not disturb a trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence; and we review conclusions of law involving interpretations of statutes de novo. Nollette v. Christianson, 115 Wn.2d 594, 600, 800 P.2d 359 (1990) (citations omitted).
Rorem challenges the court's finding that 'it was the intention of the trial court to award Ms. Coblentz $86,500.00 from the settlement proceeds, rather than $80,500.00 as shown on the Order of Distribution dated January 5, 2000.' CP at 55. This finding is amply supported by the fee agreement between Rorem and Dora and by the fact the trial judge actually calculated Dora's recovery at $86,000 at one point. Moreover, Rorem does not argue the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the finding; he simply argues that the finding is contrary to our law of the case, an argument we have already addressed.
III. Rejection of the Note
Rorem argues that Dora never accepted the note. He reminds us that Dora repeatedly demanded immediate payment of the $4,802.10, before the note matured on July 9, 2000. Rorem suggests that her demands for immediate payment exemplified her rejection of the note; and by her rejection, she discharged him of any obligation to pay on it.
RCW 62A.3-604 governs the discharge of obligations to pay on promissory notes by cancellation or renunciation. Under that provision, a person entitled to enforce an instrument may discharge the obligation of a party to pay on the instrument by 'an intentional voluntary act, such as surrender of the instrument to the party, destruction, mutilation, or cancellation of the instrument, cancellation or striking out of the party's signature, or the addition of words to the in
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