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Dakin v. Marciniak3/8/2005
adopted a discovery rule for determining when claims accrue-"on the date the injury is discovered or with reasonable diligence should be discovered"-in a products liability suit stemming from injuries caused by defendant's Dalkon Shield. Hansen v. A.H. Robins, Inc., 113 Wis. 2d 550, 560, 335 N.W.2d 578 (1983). Reversing a long line of cases holding that claims accrued on the date the injury occurred, Hansen sought to balance the threat of stale or fraudulent actions against the injustice of barring meritorious claims before the claimant knows of the injury. Id. at 559. Hansen was amplified in Borello, which held that a claim did not accrue until "the nature of the injury and the cause-or at least a relationship between the event and injury-is or ought to have been known to the claimant." Borello, 130 Wis. 2d at 406-07. Expansion of the discovery rule has been balanced by the requirement that plaintiffs exercise reasonable diligence and not ignore means of information reasonably accessible to them. See, e.g., Spitler v. Dean, 148 Wis. 2d 630, 638, 436 N.W.2d 308 (1989). When the material facts are undisputed and only one inference can reasonably be drawn, whether a plaintiff exercises reasonable diligence in the discovery of an injury is a question of law. See Groom v. Professionals Ins. Co., 179 Wis. 2d 241, 249, 507 N.W.2d 121 (Ct. App. 1993).
. Dakin's argument implies the discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations in personal injury cases until a plaintiff discovers every defendant who might be legally liable for the injury. But the fact that a claim does not accrue until the plaintiff has knowledge of a suable party does not necessarily mean that it does not accrue until all suable parties are known. The purpose of the discovery rule is to limit the manifest injustice that would arise when application of the statute of limitations would destroy the rights of injured parties who could not have brought their claims earlier. See Hansen, 113 Wis. 2d at 556. It is not a promise to suspend limitations until optimal litigation conditions are established, and we decline to expand the rule in that direction.
. Dakin's claim that the discovery rule should bar the application of the statute of limitations in her particular case is unpersuasive. Dakin argues that she did not know, and could not with reasonable diligence have learned, that Roundy's was also potentially liable as Pease's employer. Dakin admits, however, she knew she was hurt in April 2000. There is also no dispute she knew that Pease, Marciniak, and Langlade were responsible for her injuries. Dakin thus had knowledge both of injury and cause in April 2000.
. Dakin had the means of further information available to her, in the form of police reports identifying Pease and Marciniak, but apparently took no steps to investigate either the two men or the accident. Dakin suggests she could not have known about Pease's relationship with his employer because she did not allege a safe place claim, under Wis. Stat. ยง 101.11, which might have brought that relationship to light. However, Dakin's decision not to pursue a legal avenue that might have produced useful information is not evidence of reasonable diligence.
. Dakin also argues that Pease's failure to report the accident to his employer prevented her from learning that Pease worked for Copp's and therefore absolves her from the exercise of diligence. But this argument only adds circularity to burden shifting. Pease's decision not to tell Copp's about his near collision in the parking lot could not prevent an investigation never undertaken. Dakin suggests Pease's silence made discovering his relationship with Copp's more difficult, but there is no reason to beli
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