 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Lyman Lumber of Wisconsin3/29/2005
d as a setoff to Yourchuck for unfinished "punch list" items. The court determined those items were unfinished because Yourchuck had failed to cooperate with Lyman. The court awarded interest to Lyman as called for in the contract, but tolled its accrual during the pendency of the action. It also awarded attorney fees, but reduced the hourly rate to be commensurate with the prevailing Burnett County rate. Yourchuck appeals the judgment in favor of Lyman and the summary judgment dismissing its counterclaims; Lyman cross-appeals the adjustments to interest and attorney fees.
Discussion
Deadline for Entering Judgment
. We begin with Yourchuck's assertion that the trial court took too long to enter its decision. Yourchuck argues that Wis. Stat. § 805.17(2) requires judgment be entered within sixty days of the cause being "submitted in final form" and because the court took eighty-eight days before entering judgment, the judgment should be vacated. We disagree.
. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law. Hutson v. State of Wis. Personnel Comm'n, 2003 WI 97, , 263 Wis. 2d 612, 665 N.W.2d 212. " statute prescribing the time within which public officers are required to perform an official act is merely directory, unless it denies the exercise of power after such time, or the nature of the act, or the statutory language, shows that the time was intended to be a limitation." Karow v. Milwaukee County Civ. Serv. Comm'n, 82 Wis. 2d 565, 571, 263 N.W.2d 214 (1978) (citation omitted). Wisconsin Stat. § 805.17 specifies no penalty for noncompliance and does not otherwise suggest sixty days is intended as a strict limitation. In addition, our supreme court has held that the sixty-day timeframe is directory. See Merkley v. Schramm, 31 Wis. 2d 134, 138, 142 N.W.2d 173 (1966).
. Moreover, Wis. Stat. § 751.12(2) allows the supreme court to modify statutes relating to "pleading, practice, and procedure" by rules promulgated by the court. Supreme Court Rule 70.36(1)(a) establishes a ninety-day period for the court to enter judgment and allows for the possibility of a ninety-day extension. It is undisputed that the decision in this case was made within ninety days and, in any event, Yourchuck cites no authority for its proposition that dismissal is the appropriate remedy for the court's noncompliance with filing deadlines. This court will not consider arguments unsupported by legal authority. See State v. Shaffer, 96 Wis. 2d 531, 545-46 n.3, 292 N.W.2d 370 (Ct. App. 1980).
Whether the Trial Court Erred on Summary Judgment
. Regarding the summary judgment dismissing its counterclaims, Yourchuck argues that there was a factual dispute over its breach of contract counterclaim and it was therefore inappropriate for the trial court to grant summary judgment to Lyman on that issue. We conclude that Yourchuck mischaracterizes the record: the trial court did not dismiss its breach of contract counterclaim on summary judgment.
. Yourchuck bases its argument on the following portion of the transcript:
The breach will be determined by a fact finder; I am not determining it today. Nor will I apparently determine it at all. That will be for the jury[ ] to decide. And so therefore I cannot find that the contract has been breached and that I should disregard the terms excluding recovery for consequential, incidental or indirect damages. Therefore I find that summary judgment should be granted as to that and that is what I order.
. First, Lyman had not moved for summary judgment on the breach of contract claim so the question was not before the court. Second, the discussion of the contract did not begin
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Wisconsin Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|