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Lyman Lumber of Wisconsin3/29/2005
ference. Here, the trial court noted that some "punch list" items remained uncompleted, but accepted Lyman's proffered testimony that this was because Yourchuck refused to cooperate and eventually barred Lyman's entry onto the property. This is a factual determination supported by testimony, and it is not clearly erroneous. See Wis. Stat. ยง 805.17(2).
. Ultimately, the court determined that Yourchuck was entitled to a 2% setoff for the incomplete items, but concluded that Lyman's 98% completion and Yourchuck's occupancy meant that Lyman had fulfilled the essential purpose of the contract. Thus, Lyman had substantially completed the building. This entitled Lyman to collect on the contract, minus the small offset. Yourchuck failed to introduce evidence substantiating larger setoffs. To the extent its witnesses disagreed with Lyman's witnesses, it is the trial court, not this court, that determines credibility and resolves conflicts in evidence. See Rucker v. DILHR, 101 Wis. 2d 285, 290, 304 N.W.2d 169 (Ct. App. 1981).
Whether the Trial Court Could Suspend Interest
. On cross-appeal, Lyman protests suspension of interest during the pendency of the action. The contract called for a "service charge," which neither party disputes is treated like interest, in the event there was a default on payment. There is no contractual provision for suspending interest, and the trial court provided no rationale for choosing to suspend it. Yourchuck responds that it is improper for the trial court to have awarded interest at all because there was a dispute over the amount due.
. Whether preverdict interest may be awarded is a question of law. R.S. Deering Mech. Contractors v. Livesey Co., 161 Wis. 2d 727, 729, 468 N.W.2d 758 (Ct. App. 1991). Generally, prejudgment interest is awarded where the amount of damages is determinable, either because the damages are liquidated or there is a reasonably certain standard of measurement. City of Merrill v. Wenzel Bros., 88 Wis. 2d 676, 697, 277 N.W.2d 799 (1979). It is also true that if there is a real dispute over the damages owed, prejudgment interest may not be appropriate. See Teff v. Unity Health Plans Ins. Corp., 2003 WI App 115, -50, 265 Wis. 2d 703, 666 N.W.2d 38; Loehrke v. Wanta Builders, Inc., 151 Wis. 2d 695, 707, 445 N.W.2d 717 (Ct. App. 1989). Indeed, Yourchuck relies on Teff to contend that because the final amount of damages due was not determinable until the court made a decision, no interest should have been awarded.
. We are not, however, presented with the court's decision to add statutory interest. Instead, we have a contract stating, "Owner agrees to pay to Builder a service charge on any amount not paid when due at the rate of 11/2% per month (18% per annum), with a minimum of $.50 per month." The contract also provided that final payment was due on the date of "substantial completion," contractually defined as the date upon which the owner is able to occupy the building. Yourchuck moved into the building in January 2001, but Lyman agreed to June 12, 2001, as the substantial completion date within the meaning of the contract.
. "As long ago as 1899 our supreme court recognized that interest should be paid on the amount required to satisfy a contractual obligation. ... Interest is a measure of the time value of money." Deering, 161 Wis. 2d at 731 (citations omitted). The rule is "the creditor is entitled to interest from the time payment was due by the terms of the contract...." See DeWitt Ross & Stevens, S.C. v. Galaxy Gaming & Racing Ltd. P'ship, 2004 WI 92, , 273 Wis. 2d 577, 682 N.W.2d 839 (citation omitted). "Contracts ... recognize the time value of money by explicitly providing f
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