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Jauregui v. Memorial Hospital of Sweetwater County5/13/2005
. Hill, 764 P.2d 667 (Wyo. 1988) (negligent misdiagnosis); Metzger v. Kalke, 709 P.2d 414 (Wyo. 1985) (negligent misdiagnosis), the doctrine is not so strictly limited. Minnesota courts have offered a very complete definition of the "single-act" exception:
At the time Doyle filed her May 6, 1999, claim, the medical malpractice statute of limitations required that claims be commenced within two years of the accrual of the cause of action. See Minn. Stat. ยง 541.07(1) (1998). Generally, the "cause of action accrues when the physician's treatment for a particular condition ceases." Grondahl v. Bulluck, 318 N.W.2d 240, 243 (Minn. 1982) (citation omitted). This is the general termination of treatment rule.
But where there is a single act of allegedly negligent conduct, the statute of limitations begins to run at the time the plaintiff sustains damage from the act. Offerdahl v. University of Minn. Hosps. & Clinics, 426 N.W.2d 425, 428-29 (Minn. 1988). More precisely, the cause of action begins to run at the time of the negligent act (and not at the end of the course of treatment) when the alleged tort consists of (1) a single act; (2) which is complete at a precise time; (3) which no continued course of treatment can either cure or relieve; and (4) where the plaintiff is actually aware of the facts upon which the claim is based; that is, the plaintiff is aware of the malpractice prior to the end of treatment. Swang v. Hauser, 288 Minn. 306, 309, 180 N.W.2d 187, 189-90 (1970). We refer to this rule as the "single-act" exception.
Doyle v. Kuch, 611 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. App. 2000).
[ ] While the underlying facts of the instant case support a finding of the first two factors, it is factors three and four that are not supported. Dr. Oliver's continued treatment did in fact relieve the problem created by the alleged malpractice, and neither the Jaureguis nor Dr. Oliver knew of the alleged act of malpractice prior to the date Dr. Oliver completed his surgical treatment of Mr. Jauregui. The single-act exception does not apply to these facts.
[ ] Even if this Court were to determine that a single act of negligence occurred, the definition of a single act of negligence is not limited to the initial January 11, 1999, surgery. The term "single-act" is misleading. In Haberle v. Buchwald, 480 N.W.2d 351 (Minn. App. 1992), Dr. Buchwald performed gastric bypass surgery on Haberle on January 13, 1986. Severe complications arose, and two emergency surgeries were conducted within days of the initial surgery, the first on January 17 and the second on January 21. During the January 21 surgery, necrotic tissue was discovered, and the surgeon had no choice but to remove 80% of appellant's stomach. The surgeon also had to disconnect appellant's esophagus from her bowel, place a tube in her neck to drain her esophagus, and place a feeding tube in her abdomen. Haberle continued treatment with Dr. Buchwald with regard to the gastric bypass surgery and the ensuing complications. Id. at 353-54.
[ ] In 1989, Haberle sued Dr. Buchwald. Haberle asserted the continuous treatment doctrine tolled the two-year statute of limitations. The Minnesota court applied the four factors of the single-act exception to the facts of Haberle's malpractice claim and determined that the single-act exception applied:
Following the January 21 surgery, appellant either knew or should have known that there had been substantial and unforeseen complications. She had lost 80% of her stomach, and was being fed through a tube in her abdomen. From a common sense viewpoint, it is clear appellant knew or should have known the facts upon which her claim could be based as of January 21, 1986. A
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