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Berg v. State2/25/2005
er forms of reimbursement because it uses the phrase, "travel expenses," not "mileage." To support this contention, Berg cites parts of the Internal Revenue Code wherein the term "travel expenses" is defined to include amounts "expended for meals and lodging," 26 U.S.C.A. § 162(a)(2) (2002), and the cost of the lodging furnished by an employer, or on behalf of an employer, for the convenience of the employee is excluded from the employee's gross income, 26 U.S.C.A. § 119(a) (2002).
[ ] Our precedent has consistently held that § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D) requires reimbursement for transportation expenses or the employee is not considered within the scope of his employment. Archuleta, 787 P.2d at 92-93; Claims of Naylor, 723 P.2d at 1241; Matter of Willey, 571 P.2d 248, 251 (Wyo. 1977). There is no evidence in the record that Berg or Cyclone considered staying at the camp as a form of compensation for travel expenses. Indeed, as the District Court points out, all witnesses, including Berg, agreed that neither he nor Tintinger were reimbursed or compensated in any way for their travel. In the absence of any showing that his employer was to compensate Berg for his travel to the camp after he had clocked out of the job , we cannot conclude that Berg was acting within the scope of his employment when he was injured. Naylor, 723 P.2d at 1243.
[ ] Furthermore, Berg's reliance on a definition of "travel expenses" lifted from the Internal Revenue Code is simply not persuasive. Berg fails to adequately explain why we should apply a definition derived from a statutory context -- the federal tax laws -- that has a purpose that is very different from Wyoming's worker compensation laws. Under the circumstances, we cannot conclude that the free accommodations offered by Cyclone constitute a "travel expense" within the meaning of that term as used in § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D).
[ ] In his second argument, Berg contends that the hearing examiner's determination that the injury was compensable was justified because the injury he suffered while traveling from the drill site to the camp arose out of and was in the course of his employment pursuant to § 27-14-102(a)(xi), since he was required to stay at the camp by his employer to whose control he was subjected while on the premises. We do not agree.
[ ] In Chapman v. Meyers, 899 P.2d 48 (Wyo. 1995), the claimant Chapman commuted daily with three co-employees from a motel in Craig, Colorado, to their work site, a drilling rig. Id. at 50. The opinion does not disclose whether or not the employer paid for the motel accommodations. Neither Chapman nor his co-employees were reimbursed for travel to and from the drill site or paid a travel allowance as part of their wages. Id. After finishing his shift, Chapman left the drill site in a vehicle owned by the wife of a co-employee. Id. The road from the drill site was a snow-packed, two-lane, graveled public road through a mountainous area. Id. Approximately one mile from the drill site, the vehicle collided head-on with a truck, resulting in severe injuries to Chapman. Id. The hearing examiner determined that Chapman was not in the course and scope of his employment and was, therefore, denied benefits. Id. at 49. On appeal, Chapman contended that his employer "required, and contemplated" that its employees would not be able to live at the drill site and they would, of necessity, have to live in Craig and commute to the work site. Id. at 50. Accordingly, Chapman insisted, there was a sufficient nexus between the injury and his employment to justify compensation . Id. We summarily rejected Chapman's argument:
Under the factual circumstances outlined above, we are not persuaded Chapman was in the cour
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